2/10/2015

'Will the real Hamlet please stand up?' Colin Burrow


[From the Times Online (19 May 2002)]

'Will the real Hamlet please stand up?'
A new edition will offer three versions of the play.
This is a road to Shakespeare madness, says Colin Burrow

The forthcoming Arden edition of Hamlet - the most authoritative text - will apparently contain not one but three versions of the play. This has ruffled feathers in the academic world, and has been the subject of a long article in The New Yorker. Is it the end of Shakespeare as we know him, or the start of a radically new vision of the play? Is it all just academic madness? And why do we need to print three versions of Hamlet?

Well, everybody knows Hamlet says "To be or not to be, that is the question", and "To sleep, perchance to dream. Ay, there's the rub". Except in one version of the play he doesn't say either of these things. He says: "To be, or not to be, ay, there's the point,/To die, to sleep, is that all? Ay, all:/ No, to sleep, to dream; ay, marry there it goes". And instead of dying with "The rest is silence", in one version he ends: "The rest is silence. O, o, o".

The reason for these discrepancies is because three texts of Hamlet were printed in the early 17th century. They're all different and Shakespeare did not oversee a final printed version. Nobody knows for sure how the three Hamlets relate to one another and every editor of the play has a different view of how they relate to what Shakespeare wrote. Some think he revised the play. Others think he wrote a single masterpiece that the printed versions all mutilate in different ways.

The First Quarto (a quarto is a smallish book made up of sheets folded into four) was printed in 1603. It contains the "ay, marry there it goes" line. It is generally known as a "bad" quarto, because it was probably reconstructed from memory by an actor who had played Marcellus (one of the guards in the first scene.) He has an actor's eye for the detail of early productions: the mad Ophelia does not simply enter in the First Quarto, she enters "playing on a lute, and her hair down, singing". Such details may well tell us how these moments were staged in the Elizabethan theatre.

But usually poor old Marcellus (or whoever) just can't catch more than the vague gist of the play when he is offstage. Moments when Hamlet is alone and thinking aloud come out sounding as though people have been playing Chinese whispers with Shakespeare.

It's not quite "blessed are the cheese-makers", but it's getting on that way. "The undiscovered country, from whose bourn (boundary) no traveller returns" becomes gibberish: "The undiscovered country, at whose sight/ The happy smile, and the accursèd damned." There are some scenes and characters in the First Quarto that are interestingly different from the other texts of the play, and which may indicate that Shakespeare (or someone) tinkered with the structure and the characters. But the First Quarto basically shows us how Hamlet sounded to actors who waited backstage.

A year after this, another Hamlet appeared, which was twice as long as the First Quarto. The Second Quarto probably derived from Shakespeare's "foul papers", or his rough drafts of the play. It's far too long to have been performed in its entirety, but gives us most of the Hamlet we know.

It's not simply Shakespeare, though. The compositor (the printer who set the type) clearly found the manuscript a pig to read. When this Hamlet sees Claudius praying and decides not to kill him because doing so would send him to heaven, he says: "This is base and silly, not revenge." The words the printer had before him and misread were not "base and silly" but "hire and salary". Hamlet meant that sending Claudius to heaven would be a reward rather than a punishment for his murder of old Hamlet. "Base and silly" probably does not reflect what Shakespeare wrote. But despite these problems the Second Quarto is probably closest to Shakespeare's earliest and longest version.

Then in 1623, seven years after Shakespeare's death, the First Folio appeared. (A folio is made by folding sheets of paper in half; this was the first collected edition of Shakespeare's plays).

It contains yet a third version of Hamlet and is shorter than the Second Quarto.

The folio version of the play may have been cut down for performance and it may well be that Shakespeare himself revised the text. The folio Hamlet is a quirkier character than the quarto Hamlets. He habitually echoes phrases and seems to reflect on his words.

The folio Hamlet reaches for his "tables" (or notebook) to record the villainy of Claudius with "my tables, my tables". This repetition, which is only in the folio, is great for an actor: he can make Hamlet fumble for his notebook, or muse on the words he has just said. There are several moments when the folio Hamlet seems to be taking on a life of his own, and is becoming a more abstracted, reflective character. And consequently many people now believe this version reflects at least some of Shakespeare's later thoughts, which developed as he saw the play performed.

This leaves us with a bit of a mess, since it suggests that the most famous play in the world is three slightly different things. It may be that Shakespeare was almost as indecisive about the text as Hamlet is about revenge.

So what is the answer? Most of us should read a text that is made up by conflating all three versions into something which might correspond to some ideal mega-version of the play. The only trouble with this version of Hamlet - which is found in most collected editions of Shakespeare is that it doesn't correspond to anything Shakespeare can be proved to have written, since it pulls together passages from several printed versions.

Editors have been saying for a while that the three versions are distinct, and it doesn't make any sense to conflate them. The Oxford and Cambridge editions sensibly put the bits of Hamlet that appear only in the Second Quarto into appendices or square brackets, so readers can enjoy them while also being aware that they come from a different version of the play.

The forthcoming Arden Hamlet promises to be the first major edition to split the play into its three versions. But there are real problems with this, the most basic of which is that none of the surviving texts is a reliable record of even one phrase in Hamlet.

Editors of the Second Quarto text have to emend its wording when it doesn't make sense ("base and silly") and the best way to do this is to look at what the folio says. And vice versa. This means that either you print a text that records cock-ups by a compositor who couldn't read a manuscript very well, or else you conflate the texts. You can't entirely separate the texts without printing a lot of words that aren't Shakespeare's.

The second big problem is that while the First Quarto is some kind of record of a performance of Hamlet, its howlers don't warrant giving it the same status as the other texts. It's about as likely that Shakespeare wrote: "To be or not to be, ay, there's the point", as that he wrote the works of Francis Bacon.

I would enjoy a three-text Hamlet that effectively said to its readers: "Here's a massively complex textual problem; see what you can make of it." But I'm an editor of Shakespeare, a don and a nerd.

I suspect most people just won't want to read a three-text play. They probably would prefer a text they could read in an evening rather than study for a lifetime.

So the three-text Hamlet won't be the end of Shakespeare as we know him, nor does it promise a brave new world. But there is a real danger that it will mark the point at which high-level academic theorising about the text of Shakespeare will produce a version of the play that is out of touch with the needs of a wider public and which only academics will want to read. That would be a sad day.

Amleth, Prince of Denmark (Saxo Grammaticus)


1/12/2015

The Ophelia Syndrome

DIAGNOSING AND TREATING THE OPHELIA SYNDROME 

By Thomas G. Plummer

In Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3, Laertes warns his sister, Ophelia, to avoid falling in love with Hamlet, whose advances, he claims, are prompted by fleeting, youthful lust. He cautions her against Hamlet’s “unmastered importunity” and counsels her that “best safety lies in fear.”1 Then her father, Polonius, begins to meddle. He knows, he tells Ophelia, that she has responded to Hamlet’s attention and then informs her that she “does not understand [herself] so clearly.” He asks if she believes Hamlet’s affections are genuine, to which Ophelia responds, “I do not know, my lord, what I should think.” Polonius answers, “I’ll teach you. Think yourself a baby . . . .”
In this scene Shakespeare has given us the essence of what I call the “Ophelia Syndrome.” It requires two players, a Polonius and an Ophelia. It is condensed into these two lines: “I do not know, my lord, what I should think,” and, “I’ll teach you. Think yourself a baby.” Ophelia does not know what she should think, and Polonius, reducing her to the stature of a baby, presumes to tell her. Polonius pontificates. He purports to know answers when he has none. He claims to have truth when he himself obscures it. He feigns expertise by virtue of his authority. But his real interest is power: he clamors to be a parent to other adults and exhorts them to become children to his word. Ophelia is worse than naive. She is chronically ignorant, chronically dependent, and chronically submissive. She is an adult who chooses to be a baby, one who does not know her own opinions and who would not express them to an authority if she did.

S.I. Hayakawa describes symptoms of the Ophelia Syndrome in his essay “What Does It Mean to Be Creative?”:

Most people don’t know the answer to the question, “How are you? How do you feel?” The reason why they don’t know is that they are so busy feeling what they are supposed to feel, thinking what they are supposed to think, that they never get down to examining their own deepest feelings. “How did you like the play?” “Oh, it was a fine play. It was well reviewed in the New Yorker. With authority figures like drama critics and book reviewers and teachers and professors telling us what to think and how to feel, many of us are busy playing roles, fulfilling other people’s expectations. As Republicans, we think what other Republicans think. As Catholics, we think what other Catholics think. And so on. Not many of us ask ourselves, “How do I feel? What do I think?”—and wait for an answer.2

Charles Schultz characterized the Ophelia Syndrome more succinctly in thisPeanuts cartoon:

Psychologist Carl Jung describes this dependence on others for one’s thoughts in the context of his discussion of “individuation.”3 Individuation is the process of learning to differentiate oneself from others. It is a psychological “growing up.” It means to discover those aspects of the self that distinguish one person from another. Failure to achieve individuation leaves people dependent on other, stronger personalities for their identity. They fail to understand their uniqueness.4

I have a friend who is fond of saying, “If we both think the same way, one of us is unnecessary.” The clone, the chameleon personality is the Ophelia Syndrome in another form. One reading of Ophelia’s suicide later in Hamlet suggests that because she has no thoughts of her own, because she has listened only to the contradictory voices of the men around her—Laertes, Polonius, and Hamlet—she reaches a breaking point. They have all used her: “She is only valued for the roles that further other people’s plots. Treated as a helpless child, she finally becomes one . . . .”5 Her childishness is just a step along the regression to suicide, a natural—if not logical—solution to her dependence on conflicting authorities.
The Ophelia Syndrome manifests itself in universities. The Ophelia (substitute a male name if you choose) writes copious notes in every class and memorizes them for examinations.6 The Polonius writes examination questions that address just what was covered in the textbook or lectures. The Ophelia wants to know exactly what the topic for a paper should be. The Polonius prescribes it. The Ophelia wants to be a parrot, because it feels safe. The Polonius enjoys making parrot cages. In the end, the Ophelia becomes the clone of the Polonius, and one of them is unnecessary. I worry often that universities may be rendering their most serious students, those who have been “good” all their lives, vulnerable to the Ophelia Syndrome rather than motivating them to individuation.

And so what? Is it such a bad thing to emulate teachers? What if you are a student of biochemistry or German grammar? Then you have to memorize information and take notes from instructors who know more, because the basic material is factual. There is no other way. And this is a temporary condition of many areas of study. But eventually every discipline enters into the unknown, the uncertain, the theoretical, the hypothetical, where teachers can no longer tell students with certainty what they should think. It is only an illusion, a wish of the Ophelias and the Poloniuses that literary texts have just one interpretation or that the exact sciences be exact. At its best, even science is a creative art. Hayakawa quotes his good friend Alfred Korzybski as saying,

Creative scientists know very well from observation of themselves that all creative work starts as a feeling, inclination, suspicion, intuition, hunch, or some other nonverbal affective state, which only at a later date, after a sort of nursing, takes the shape of verbal expression worked out later in a rationalized, coherent . . . theory.7

Most of us have metaphors—either subconsciously or consciously—of our student experience. I asked several of my students about theirs. One said he thinks of himself as a computer with insufficient memory. He is able to enter information but cannot recall it. One said he is a sieve. A lot of stuff goes right on through, but important pieces stay lodged. One said she feels like a pedestrian in front of a steamroller, and the driver will not give her any hints about how to get out of the way. Another described his metaphor as a tennis match in which he must anticipate his instructor’s response to each shot. Another thought of herself as a dog jumping through a hoop. Another described himself as a mouse in a maze with no directional signs and no exits. Another as a child in a candy store where you can choose only one or two pieces to take home. These metaphors describe people at various stages along the way from Ophelia to individuation.

Talk is cheap. It’s fine to say, “Learn to think for yourself,” and it’s quite another to do it. A recent Fortune magazine article described the plight of middle managers in American corporations. Driven by chief executive officers at the top for greater profits and productivity, many are working 70 or 80 hours a week and sometimes more. The article reports that the corporate byword for urging these people on is “think smarter.” But since no one really knows what that means or how to think smarter, they just work longer. And people are burning out.8

Learning to think while still in college has its advantages. It may mean shorter working hours later on. It may mean not having a mid-life crisis because you chose to study what you wanted rather than something that someone else wanted you to study. It may mean becoming your own person. It may, purely and simply, mean a much happier life. I want to suggest six things you can do—six things I wish I had done—to treat the Ophelia Syndrome.


TREATMENT 1.
Seek Out and Learn from Great Teachers, Regardless of What They Teach.

How do you find them? First of all, they have a reputation among students. They are known to set people on fire, to inspire them. They are known to be challenging, fair, and tough. They refuse to be a Polonius, they refuse to make you a baby, and they refuse to do your thinking for you. They join you as a partner in a learning and research enterprise. I recently heard a nationally televised interview with violinist Itzhak Perlman and his teacher, Dorothy Delay, at Julliard School of Music. Perlman, now 45, was sent to Julliard as a gifted child prodigy. He was angry to have been sent to New York, far from his friends and family in Israel, and he was furious to live in the Julliard student hotel, an environment that he considered unseemly.
The interviewer asked him how he had liked his teacher.
“I hated her,” he replied.
Ms. Delay, a gentle woman with an air of complete calm, smiled into the camera. “I hated her,” he repeated.
“Why?” the interviewer asked.
“She would never tell me what to do,” said Perlman. “She would stop me in the middle of a scale and say, ‘Now Itzhak, what is your concept of a C-sharp?’ It made me furious. She refused to tell me what to do. “But,” he went on, “I began to think as I played. My playing became an engaging intellectual exercise in which I understood every note and why I played it the way I did, because I had thought about it myself.”
In that same spirit, Wayne Booth in his book, The Vocation of a Teacher,asserts that regardless of whether a teacher lectures or runs discussions, the “teacher has failed if students leave the classroom assuming that the task of thinking through to the next step lies entirely with the teacher.”9 To this point, Booth adds three more principles that will help teachers and students avoid the Polonius role. Addressing instructors, he writes:
1. You gotta get them talking to each other, not just to you or to the air.
2. You gotta get them talking about the subject, not just having a bull session in which nobody really listens to anybody else. This means insisting on at least the following rule in every discussion: Whether I call on you or you speak up spontaneously, please address the previous speaker, or give a reason for changing the subject.
3. You gotta find ways to prevent yourself from relapsing into a badly prepared lecturette, disguised as a discussion. Informal lectures are usually worse than prepared ones.10

TREATMENT 2.11
Dare to Know and Trust Yourself

Perhaps it goes without saying that you cannot know what to think if you do not know who you are. People go about self-discovery in various ways, and I can only share my own experience. I did not begin a truly honest search for my “self” until I was 40 years old. Then it became an obsession. I took personality tests. I re-read old letters I had written and received. I began keeping a journal. I wish I had done it all 20 years before.
I now keep track of myself and my thinking through writing. I write letters and keep copies of what I write. I have had two sons on missions, and I make sure that I say things to them not only that I want to say but also that I want to remember. Second, I keep a journal—sporadically but frequently. I never take more than five or ten minutes to write in it, and when I write, I write intensively. I write to find my own voice, my own thoughts. I do not worry about who may read it later. It is for me. I write about my subconscious as well as my conscious self, because I believe that dreams do much of my thinking for me. Here is a dream from November 15, 1987:
Louise and I were driving through a sparsely populated, desolate area. The car engine faltered and quit. Luckily just across the road was a Chevron station. I knew the repair work was minor and pushed the car into the station. It was ready later in the day. 
The service station attendant pushed a credit card bill toward me and said, “Sign here.” I signed. “How much was the repair?” I asked. 
“$963.” He replied. 
“$963? What cost $963?” I was incredulous. 
“Well, the repair work, and we put in a new dashboard.” 
“A new dashboard? How come a new dashboard?” 
“The old one was scratched up.” He replied. 
“Why didn’t you ask me before you did that?” I was now screaming. “I won’t pay.” 
“You’ve signed the bill,” he said. “You have to pay.” His voice was gravely, firm. 
He was right. I’d signed the bill. I had to pay. 
“Just let me see the bill again,” I asked. “I won’t destroy it, I’m not a cheater.”
Reluctantly, he let me take it. I could tell he didn’t trust me. Other mechanics surrounded me and stared, sober faced, menacing. Heavy, burly faces. I looked at the bill. $963. It would take months to pay off.
As I look back through this journal, I rediscover myself. There are notes about my son’s crisis with his mission president, a painful chapter, and my efforts to play diplomat. There is a love note from my wife, notes on a line from Blake’s poem, “London,” reflections on a painting in our dining room, a list of highlights from 25 years of marriage, a greedy wish list for ourselves, plans for a trip to Tokyo, a red horse chestnut blossom from a BYU tree, and a poem in reference to William Carlos Williams:
The chocolate hazelnut torte
At the Market Street Broiler
After a bowl of clam chowder
Makes more of a difference
Than that red wheelbarrow.
There is a tribute to shrimp scampi, eaten at dinner at Sundance on May 5, 1989, with Elizabeth and Daryl Pederson:
Hail shrimp scampi, a flourish
of trumpets!
Shrimp beats the hell out
of tea and crumpets!
Shrimp and pasta and garlic butter,
Divine crustaceans, you set
me aflutter.

The point is this: As I write my life, I learn my thoughts, whether good or ill, conscious or subconscious. They are my thoughts, and as I come to recognize them I become less and less vulnerable to the Ophelia Syndrome through which others once dictated my life to me.
You can also increase your confidence in your own judgement if you take courses that teach you how to ask good questions, how to define the terms of your position, how to employ strategies of rhetoric and logical argumentation, and how to employ critical theory. Such courses may be elementary philosophy classes, advanced literature classes, or math classes. One of my colleagues once quipped, “If a course isn’t about method, it isn’t about much of anything.” I believe that.
As you come to know yourself and gain confidence in critical skills, you must also learn to play your hunches, to follow your intuition through. You truly are the only one who knows what you think and feel, and you, consequently are the only one who knows what feelings and ideas you must follow through on.

TREATMENT 3.
Learn to Live with Uncertainty

To put it differently, surrender the need for absolute truth. The English poet John Keats wrote a landmark letter to his brothers, George and Thomas Keats, on December 22, 1817. It has become known as the letter on “Negative Capability.” In part it reads,
. . . it struck me what quality went to form a Man [or Woman] of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.
I do not want to do Keats an injustice by oversimplifying a magnificent statement, but I believe he is saying essentially this: The world is a complex place, and absolute truth is elusive, indeed: the greatness in Shakespeare may be attributed to the fact that he didn’t feel inclined to explain what he could not, but only to portray the human condition as he saw it.
This concept drives a stake into the heart of the notion that Polonius has the answers. Overcoming the Ophelia Syndrome, becoming an independent thinker, includes giving up romantic notions of the world as a place where everything can be explained. It includes giving up the need to be fooled into thinking that Polonius does indeed have the answers when he does not. I wish he did. I wish I did. I wish any or all of my colleagues did. We do not. We can only join with students and others in the pursuit of answers, and even then we must remain ultimately in some degree of uncertainty.
The corollary to this is that to treat the Ophelia Syndrome, one must develop a healthy distrust of authorities and experts. Experts disagree more often than they agree. Those who pose as authorities are as likely to be a Polonius trying to turn Ophelia into a baby as they are to have a real handle on what they are talking about. Is there a solution? I can think of two: First, for every important opinion you hear, get a second opinion. Second, in the words of the Lord in the 9th section of the Doctrine and Covenants, study it out in your own heart.
When I was in graduate school, I took a seminar on Heinrich von Kleist from Bernhard Blume, one of the grand old men of German scholarship. One day we were to discuss a paper by a classmate, Ken Tigar, on Kleist’s play, Der zerbrochene Krug. The paper seemed sound enough to the rest of us. Tigar’s argument was based on a description written by professor Walter Muschg, the great Kleist scholar at the University of Basel, of a plate with figures engraved on it. Professor Blume came to class with a large volume under his arm. He opened it to a picture of the plate that Muschg had described and passed it around.
“Well,” he asked, “what do you see?”
No one saw anything.
“Does the woman look pregnant to you?” he asked.
Ken’s face blanched.
Professor Blume continued, “No. But Muschg says she is pregnant, and Mr. Tigar’s paper rests on that premise.”
Ken stammered, “I just thought Muschg would be right.”
Professor Blume shut the book and said, “Let that be a lesson to you. Never trust anyone. You must examine the source yourself.”

TREATMENT 4.
Practice Dialectical Thinking

By dialectical thinking, I mean thinking in alternatives and, if possible, in opposites. If you hear one solution to a problem, look for an alternative solution. If you write a draft from one point of view, write a revision from another point of view. If you formulate an argument on a point, try to formulate a counterargument. I have one student who writes his journal entries in dialogues. The speakers argue with each other. He is thinking dialectically. If you see things from a male point of view, think about them from a female point of view for a change. Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg defines morality as the ability to see an issue from points of view other than just your own. He cites E.M. Forster’s observation that most of the trouble in the world is due to our “inability to imagine the innerness of other lives.”12
And this is where your peers come in. They represent alternative points of view. Their ideas are as important—if not more important—than your instructor’s. The most memorable hours of my graduate education were not spent in the classroom. Some were spent with classmates in the cafe across the street after class. That is where Vicki Rippere, my classmate from Barnard, introduced me to critical theory. Some were spent in the graduate students’ room on the third floor of Boylston Hall. That is where Bodo Reichenbach and Mark Lowry debated hotly for two hours about whether Faust was a moral man.
You may have to please Polonius by writing acceptable papers for him, but your peers will teach you how to escape his power as you wrestle with them.

TREATMENT 5.
Foster Idle Thinking

I asked a friend of mine, a neurologist, how he thinks. He said, “If I have to tell a patient something hard, and I don’t know how to do it, I sit in my office and daydream or fantasize about something that has nothing to do with the problem. When I am through, I know what I have to say.” This is a strategy for thinking by disengaging with the subject.
My wife, a fiction writer, gets her best ideas by taking long, hot baths. She doesn’t try to think in the tub. She just soaks. Ideas float in of their own volition. Other people may take hikes, play basketball, or ride bikes. Still others may read novels or magazines. Idle thinking frees the mind for creative ideas. Hayakawa suggests that the creative person “is able to entertain and play with ideas that the average person may regard as silly, mistaken, or downright dangerous.”
One of my students asked me if I thought television was bad for the mind. He said his father was always arguing that students in his day did more thinking than students today. I may have answered unequivocally “yes” to that question ten years ago. Now I am not so sure. If television is a means of retreating totally from thinking, then of course it is bad. But it may be as entertaining and pleasant as a hike or a long bath. The answer is no longer so clear-cut for me.

TREATMENT 6.
Plan to Step Out Of Bounds

By “out of bounds,” I mean out of the limits that Polonius may have prescribed for you. Independent thinking means to question the presumed bounds of thinking, reading, writing, or learning in general. A colleague at BYU once told me that years ago as a student, in a moment of boredom and desperation, he wrote a final examination in the form of a rhymed poem. He got an “A.”
My own best experience with this was two years ago. It was Saturday night, the last night of final examinations, 7 to 10pm. I dutifully carried prepared tests to my class on “Reader-Response Theory,” a course for advanced undergraduate and graduate humanities students. As I walked through the door, Holly Lavenstein, a gutsy student now enrolled in a graduate program in filmmaking in Chicago, met me. She looked me straight in the eye and said, “We don’t want to write an examination.”
Now Holly didn’t threaten me at all, but the better part of honesty told me that the written exam I had under my arm was an exercise in futility. The students had already written three papers, a weekly journal, and complete reading notes. What more did I need to grade them?
“Well, we have to have a final.” I said. My voice lacked conviction.
Yes, but not that one,” she replied, pointing to the stack I was cradling. “If you’ll step out in the hall for five minutes, we’ll give you an alternative proposal.”
Obediently I stepped back into the hall of the Maeser Building and sat on the steps. There was a lot of talking going on behind the door, and I could tell the tone was earnest, the atmosphere heated. In about five minutes, Holly poked her head out and motioned me in.
“We want a group oral examination,” she said.
“And how’s that supposed to work?” I asked.
“You just sit and watch,” she said, “and we’ll talk about what we learned in the course. I will lead the discussion. You don’t have to do anything.”
“Okay,” I said, “On two conditions: First, everyone has to talk; and, second, everyone gets the same grade as the lowest performer on the exam.”
Those were two of the finest hours of my entire career. The conversation was lively and challenging. The class became united. People who hadn’t said five words all semester were talking like crazy. Of course the group would have killed them if they hadn’t. They talked reasonably, they argued, they screamed and hollered at each other.
When three hours had passed, Holly turned to me and said, “Well, how did we do?”
“‘A!’” I said, “The best ‘A’ I ever gave.”
The point here, however, is not that grade. The point is that this class, as a group, realized that their learning experience was more important than the grade, and they were willing to put all of their grades on the line to prove it. Sometimes escaping the Ophelia Syndrome means taking that kind of risk.
Treating the Ophelia Syndrome has its price. Only you can decide whether taking control of your education, whether using college as a time to achieve individuation, is worth it:
1) It may take time. A student in my class said, “I don’t have time to learn to think in college.” He said it sincerely. I inferred from what he said that getting out of college on a fast track was important to him. He wanted to be shown the hoops and jump through them. One of the costs of thinking is time. It means enrolling in courses not relevant to your major or minor because you want to take some great teacher outside your field. Or it may mean investing more time in discussions with classmates than you want to spare. Thinking takes time.
2) It means tolerating confusion about insoluble problems rather than finding “safety” in the arms of a Polonius who offers you a security blanket.
3) It means possibly getting lower grades that you’d like while you take a challenging teacher or try something out of the ordinary on an assignment.
4) It may mean going against the advice of people you love. One student noted in my class that it was hard to grow up as a good child and then study something that worries or frightens your parents. At the end of Act 1, Scene 3, Ophelia submits to Polonius: “I shall obey, my lord.”
To all of this I can only ask, which is the greater price to pay: “To think or not to think”?





NOTES:
1. I am indebted to Kimberly Halladay, a BYU student, whose paper Ophelia Oppressed (English 252, Spring 1990), led me to coin the term, the Ophelia Syndrome. Dr. Clyde Parker and Dr. Jane Lawson introduced me to theories of cognitive development from which I distilled several ideas into the Ophelia Syndrome.
2. S. I. Hayakawa, What Does It Mean to Be Creative? Through the Communication Barrier, ed. Arthur Chandler (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 104-105.
3. Halladay's paper applies Jung's idea to Ophelia.
4. Carl G. Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959). Discussed in Wilfred L. Guerin et al., A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature, 2nd edition (New York: Harper & Row), 178-183.
5. David Leverenz, The Woman in Hamlet: An Interpersonal View, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 4 (1978): 302-303.
6. Erich Fromm, Learning, To Have or To Be (New York: Harper & Row), 17-19.
7. Hayakawa, 105.
8. Is Your Company Asking Too Much? Fortune, March 12, 1990:39-46.
9. Wayne C. Booth, What Little I Think I Know about Teaching, The Vocation of a Teacher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 214.
10. Booth, 215.
11. I became familiar with the general idea of dialectical learning in an article by William G. Perry, Jr., Cognitive and Ethical Growth: The Making of Meaning, The Modern American College, eds. Arthur W. Chickering et al (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981), 76-116.
12. Lawrence Kohlberg, A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Moral Education. Humanist 32.6 (1972):15.

Dr. Thomas G. Plummer is a professor of Germanic and Slavic languages at BYU. He delivered this faculty lecture to Delta Phi Alpha, the German Honor Society, April 5, 1990.

11/27/2014

Elaine Showalter - REPRESENTING OPHELIA: Women, Madness, and the Responsibilities of Feminist Criticism




Elaine Showalter



“As a sort of a come-on, I announced that I would speak today about that piece of bait named Ophelia, and I'll be as good as my word.” These are the words which begin the psychoanalytic seminar on Hamlet presented in Paris in 1959 by Jacques Lacan. But despite his promising come-on, Lacan was not as good as his word. He goes on for some 41 pages to speak about Hamlet, and when he does mention Ophelia, she is merely what Lacan calls “the object Ophelia”—that is, the object of Hamlet's male desire. The etymology of Ophelia, Lacan asserts, is “O-phallus,” and her role in the drama can only be to function as the exteriorized figuration of what Lacan predictably and, in view of his own early work with psychotic women, disappointingly suggests is the phallus as transcendental signifier.1 To play such a part obviously makes Ophelia “essential,” as Lacan admits; but only because, in his words, “she is linked forever, for centuries, to the figure of Hamlet.”

The bait-and-switch game that Lacan plays with Ophelia is a cynical but not unusual instance of her deployment in psychiatric and critical texts. For most critics of Shakespeare, Ophelia has been an insignificant minor character in the play, touching in her weakness and madness but chiefly interesting, of course, in what she tells us about Hamlet. And while female readers of Shakespeare have often attempted to champion Ophelia, even feminist critics have done so with a certain embarrassment. As Annette Kolodny ruefully admits: “it is after all, an imposition of high order to ask the viewer to attend to Ophelia's sufferings in a scene where, before, he's always so comfortably kept his eye fixed on Hamlet.”2

Yet when feminist criticism allows Ophelia to upstage Hamlet, it also brings to the foreground the issues in an ongoing theoretical debate about the cultural links between femininity, female sexuality, insanity, and representation. Though she is neglected in criticism, Ophelia is probably the most frequently illustrated and cited of Shakespeare's heroines. Her visibility as a subject in literature, popular culture, and painting, from Redon who paints her drowning, to Bob Dylan, who places her on Desolation Row, to Cannon Mills, which has named a flowery sheet pattern after her, is in inverse relation to her invisibility in Shakespearean critical texts: Why has she been such a potent and obsessive figure in our cultural mythology? Insofar as Hamlet names Ophelia as “woman” and “frailty,” substituting an ideological view of femininity for a personal one, is she indeed representative of Woman, and does her madness stand for the oppression of women in society as well as in tragedy? Furthermore, since Laertes calles Ophelia a “document in madness,” does she represent the textual archetype of woman as madness or madness as woman? And finally, how should feminist criticism represent Ophelia in its own discourse? What is our responsibility towards her as character and as woman?

Feminist critics have offered a variety of responses to these questions. Some have maintained that we should represent Ophelia as a lawyer represents a client, that we should become her Horatia, in this harsh world reporting her and her cause aright to the unsatisfied. Carol Neely, for example, describes advocacy—speaking for Ophelia—as our proper role: “As a feminist critic,” she writes, “I must `tell' Ophelia's story.”3 But what can we mean by Ophelia's story? The story of her life? The story of her betrayal at the hands of her father, lover, court, society? The story of her rejection and marginalization by male critics of Shakespeare? Shakespeare gives us very little information from which to imagine a past for Ophelia. She appears in only five of the play's twenty scenes; the pre-play course of her love story with Hamlet is known only by a few ambiguous flashbacks. Her tragedy is subordinated in the play; unlike Hamlet, she does not struggle with moral choices or alternatives. Thus another feminist critic, Lee Edwards, concludes that it is impossible to reconstruct Ophelia's biography from the text: “We can imagine Hamlet's story without Ophelia, but Ophelia literally has no story without Hamlet.”4

If we turn from American to French feminist theory, Ophelia might confirm the impossibility of representing the feminine in patriarchal discourse as other than madness, incoherence, fluidity, or silence. In French theoretical criticism, the feminine or “Woman” is that which escapes representation in patriarchal language and symbolism; it remains on the side of negativity, absence, and lack. In comparison to Hamlet, Ophelia is certainly a creature of lack. “I think nothing, my lord,” she tells him in the Mousetrap scene, and he cruelly twists her words:

Hamlet: That's a fair thought to lie between maids' legs.
Ophelia: What is, my lord?
Hamlet: Nothing.
(III.ii. 117-19)

In Elizabethan slang, “nothing” was a term for the female genitalia, as in Much Ado About Nothing. To Hamlet, then, “nothing” is what lies between maids' legs, for, in the male visual system of representation and desire, women's sexual organs, in the words of the French psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray, “represent the horror of having nothing to see.”5 When Ophelia is mad, Gertrude says that “Her speech is nothing,” mere “unshaped use.” Ophelia's speech thus represents the horror of having nothing to say in the public terms defined by the court. Deprived of thought, sexuality, language, Ophelia's story becomes the Story of O—the zero, the empty circle or mystery of feminine difference, the cipher of female sexuality to be deciphered by feminist interpretation.6

A third approach would be to read Ophelia's story as the female subtext of the tragedy, the repressed story of Hamlet. In this reading, Ophelia represents the strong emotions that the Elizabethans as well as the Freudians thought womanish and unmanly. When Laertes weeps for his dead sister he says of his tears that “When these are gone, / The woman will be out”—that is to say, that the feminine and shameful part of his nature will be purged. According to David Leverenz, in an important essay called “The Woman in Hamlet,” Hamlet's disgust at the feminine passivity in himself is translated into violent revulsion against women, and into his brutal behavior towards Ophelia. Ophelia's suicide, Leverenz argues, then becomes “a microcosm of the male world's banishment of the female, because `woman' represents everything denied by reasonable men.”7

It is perhaps because Hamlet's emotional vulnerability can so readily be conceptualized as feminine that this is the only heroic male role in Shakespeare which has been regularly acted by women, in a tradition from Sarah Bernhardt to, most recently, Diane Venora, in a production directed by Joseph Papp. Leopold Bloom speculates on this tradition in Ulysses, musing on the Hamlet of the actress Mrs Bandman Palmer: “Male impersonator. Perhaps he was a woman? Why Ophelia committed suicide?”8

While all of these approaches have much to recommend them, each also presents critical problems. To liberate Ophelia from the text, or to make her its tragic center, is to re-appropriate her for our own ends; to dissolve her into a female symbolism of absence is to endorse our own marginality; to make her Hamlet's anima is to reduce her to a metaphor of male experience. I would like to propose instead that Ophelia does have a story of her own that feminist criticism can tell; it is neither her life story, nor her love story, nor Lacan's story, but rather the history of her representation. This essay tries to bring together some of the categories of French feminist thought about the “feminine” with the empirical energies of American historical and critical research: to yoke French theory and Yankee knowhow.
Tracing the iconography of Ophelia in English and French painting, photography, psychiatry, and literature, as well as in theatrical production, I will be showing first of all the representational bonds between female insanity and female sexuality. Secondly, I want to demonstrate the two-way transaction between psychiatric theory and cultural representation. As one medical historian has observed, we could provide a manual of female insanity by chronicling the illustrations of Ophelia; this is so because the illustrations of Ophelia have played a major role in the theoretical construction of female insanity.9 Finally, I want to suggest that the feminist revision of Ophelia comes as much from the actress's freedom as from the critic's interpretation.10 When Shakespeare's heroines began to be played by women instead of boys, the presence of the female body and female voice, quite apart from details of interpretation, created new meanings and subversive tensions in these roles, and perhaps most importantly with Ophelia. Looking at Ophelia's history on and off the stage, I will point out the contest between male and female representations of Ophelia, cycles of critical repression and feminist reclamation of which contemporary feminist criticism is only the most recent phase. By beginning with these data from cultural history, instead of moving from the grid of literary theory, I hope to conclude with a fuller sense of the responsibilities of feminist criticism, as well as a new perspective on Ophelia.
. . . . .
“Of all the characters in Hamlet,” Bridget Lyons has pointed out, “Ophelia is most persistently presented in terms of symbolic meanings.”11 Her behavior, her appearance, her gestures, her costume, her props, are freighted with emblematic significance, and for many generations of Shakespearean critics her part in the play has seemed to be primarily iconographic. Ophelia's symbolic meanings, moreover, are specifically feminine. Whereas for Hamlet madness is metaphysical, linked with culture, for Ophelia it is a product of the female body and female nature, perhaps that nature's purest form. On the Elizabethan stage, the conventions of female insanity were sharply defined. Ophelia dresses in white, decks herself with “fantastical garlands” of wild flowers, and enters, according to the stage directions of the “Bad” Quarto, “distracted” playing on a lute with her “hair down singing.” Her speeches are marked by extravagant metaphors, lyrical free associations, and “explosive sexual imagery.”12 She sings wistful and bawdy ballads, and ends her life by drowning.

All of these conventions carry specific messages about femininity and sexuality. Ophelia's virginal and vacant white is contrasted with Hamlet's scholar's garb, his “suits of solemn black.” Her flowers suggest the discordant double images of female sexuality as both innocent blossoming and whorish contamination; she is the “green girl” of pastoral, the virginal “Rose of May” and the sexually explicit madwoman who, in giving away her wild flowers and herbs, is symbolically deflowering herself. The “weedy trophies” and phallic “long purples” which she wears to her death intimate an improper and discordant sexuality that Gertrude's lovely elegy cannot quite obscure.13 In Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, the stage direction that a woman enters with dishevelled hair indicates that she might either be mad or the victim of a rape; the disordered hair, her offense against decorum, suggests sensuality in each case.14 The mad Ophelia's bawdy songs and verbal license, while they give her access to “an entirely different range of experience” from what she is allowed as the dutiful daughter, seem to be her one sanctioned form of self-assertion as a woman, quickly followed, as if in retribution, by her death.15

Drowning too was associated with the feminine, with female fluidity as opposed to masculine aridity. In his discussion of the “Ophelia complex,” the phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard traces the symbolic connections between women, water, and death. Drowning, he suggests, becomes the truly feminine death in the dramas of literature and life, one which is a beautiful immersion and submersion in the female element. Water is the profound and organic symbol of the liquid woman whose eyes are so easily drowned in tears, as her body is the repository of blood, amniotic fluid, and milk. A man contemplating this feminine suicide understands it by reaching for what is feminine in himself, like Laertes, by a temporary surrender to his own fluidity—that is, his tears; and he becomes a man again in becoming once more dry—when his tears are stopped.16

Clinically speaking, Ophelia's behavior and appearance are characteristic of the malady the Elizabethans would have diagnosed as female love-melancholy, or erotomania. From about 1580, melancholy had become a fashionable disease among young men, especially in London, and Hamlet himself is a prototype of the melancholy hero. Yet the epidemic of melancholy associated with intellectual and imaginative genius “curiously bypassed women.” Women's melancholy was seen instead as biological, and emotional in origins.17
On the stage, Ophelia's madness was presented as the predictable outcome of erotomania. From 1660, when women first appeared on the public stage, to the beginnings of the eighteenth century, the most celebrated of the actresses who played Ophelia were those whom rumor credited with disappointments in love. The greatest triumph was reserved for Susan Mountfort, a former actress at Lincoln's Inn Fields who had gone mad after her lover's betrayal. One night in 1720 she escaped from her keeper, rushed to the theater, and just as the Ophelia of the evening was to enter for her mad scene, “sprang forward in her place ... with wild eyes and wavering motion.”18 As a contemporary reported, “she was in truth Ophelia herself, to the amazement of the performers as well as of the audience—nature having made this last effort, her vital powers failed her and she died soon after.”19 These theatrical legends reinforced the belief of the age that female madness was a part of female nature, less to be imitated by an actress than demonstrated by a deranged woman in a performance of her emotions.

The subversive or violent possibilities of the mad scene were nearly eliminated, however, on the eighteenth-century stage. Late Augustan stereotypes of female love-melancholy were sentimentalized versions which minimized the force of female sexuality, and made female insanity a pretty stimulant to male sensibility. Actresses such as Mrs Lessingham in 1772, and Mary Bolton in 1811, played Ophelia in this decorous style, relying on the familiar images of the white dress, loose hair, and wild flowers to convey a polite feminine distraction, highly suitable for pictorial reproduction, and appropriate for Samuel Johnson's description of Ophelia as young, beautiful, harmless, and pious. Even Mrs Siddons in 1785 played the mad scene with stately and classical dignity. For much of the period, in fact, Augustan objections to the levity and indecency of Ophelia's language and behavior led to censorship of the part. Her lines were frequently cut, and the role was often assigned to a singer instead of an actress, making the mode of representation musical rather than visual or verbal.
But whereas the Augustan response to madness was a denial, the romantic response was an embrace.20 The figure of the madwoman permeates romantic literature, from the gothic novelists to Wordsworth and Scott in such texts as “The Thorn” and The Heart of Midlothian, where she stands for sexual victimization, bereavement, and thrilling emotional extremity. Romantic artists such as Thomas Barker and George Shepheard painted pathetically abandoned Crazy Kates and Crazy Anns, while Henry Fuseli's “Mad Kate” is almost demonically possessed, an orphan of the romantic storm.

In the Shakespearean theater, Ophelia's romantic revival began in France rather than England. When Charles Kemble made his Paris debut as Hamlet with an English troupe in 1827, his Ophelia was a young Irish ing énue named Harriet Smithson. Smithson used “her extensive command of mime to depict in precise gesture the state of Ophelia's confused mind.”21 In the mad scene, she entered in a long black veil, suggesting the standard imagery of female sexual mystery in the gothic novel, with scattered bedlamish wisps of straw in her hair. Spreading the veil on the ground as she sang, she spread flowers upon it in the shape of a cross, as if to make her father's grave, and mimed a burial, a piece of stage business which remained in vogue for the rest of the century.

The French audiences were stunned. Dumas recalled that “it was the first time I saw in the theatre real passions, giving life to men and women of flesh and blood.”22 The 23-year-old Hector Berlioz, who was in the audience on the first night, fell madly in love, and eventually married Harriet Smithson despite his family's frantic opposition. Her image as the mad Ophelia was represented in popular lithographs and exhibited in bookshop and printshop windows. Her costume was imitated by the fashionable, and a coiffure “à la folle,” consisting of a “black veil with wisps of straw tastefully interwoven” in the hair, was widely copied by the Parisian beau monde, always on the lookout for something new.23

Although Smithson never acted Ophelia on the English stage, her intensely visual performance quickly influenced English productions as well; and indeed the romantic Ophelia—a young girl passionately and visibly driven to picturesque madness—became the dominant international acting style for the next 150 years, from Helena Modjeska in Poland in 1871, to the 18-year-old Jean Simmons in the Laurence Olivier film of 1948.
Whereas the romantic Hamlet, in Coleridge's famous dictum, thinks too much, has an “overbalance of the contemplative faculty” and an overactive intellect, the romantic Ophelia is a girl who feels too much, who drowns in feeling. The romantic critics seem to have felt that the less said about Ophelia the better; the point was to look at her. Hazlitt, for one, is speechless before her, calling her “a character almost too exquisitely touching to be dwelt upon.”24 While the Augustans represent Ophelia as music, the romantics transform her into an objet d'art, as if to take literally Claudius's lament, “poor Ophelia / Divided from herself and her fair judgment, / Without the which we are pictures.”

Smithson's performance is best recaptured in a series of pictures done by Delacroix from 1830 to 1850, which show a strong romantic interest in the relation of female sexuality and insanity.25 The most innovative and influential of Delacroix's lithographs is La Mort d'Ophélie of 1843, the first of three studies. Its sensual languor, with Ophelia half-suspended in the stream as her dress slips from her body, anticipated the fascination with the erotic trance of the hysteric as it would be studied by Jean-Martin Charcot and his students, including Janet and Freud. Delacroix's interest in the drowning Ophelia is also reproduced to the point of obsession in later nineteenth-century painting. The English Pre-Raphaelites painted her again and again, choosing the drowning which is only described in the play, and where no actress's image had preceded them or interfered with their imaginative supremacy.
In the Royal Academy show of 1852, Arthur Hughes's entry shows a tiny waif-like creature—a sort of Tinker Bell Ophelia—in a filmy white gown, perched on a tree trunk by the stream. The overall effect is softened, sexless, and hazy, although the straw in her hair resembles a crown of thorns. Hughes's juxtaposition of childlike femininity and Christian martyrdom was overpowered, however, by John Everett Millais's great painting of Ophelia in the same show. While Millais's Ophelia is sensuous siren as well as victim, the artist rather than the subject dominates the scene. The division of space between Ophelia and the natural details Millais had so painstakingly pursued reduces her to one more visual object; and the painting has such a hard surface, strangely flattened perspective, and brilliant light that it seems cruelly indifferent to the woman's death.
. . . . .
These Pre-Raphaelite images were part of a new and intricate traffic between images of women and madness in late nineteenth-century literature, psychiatry, drama, and art. First of all, superintendents of Victorian lunatic asylums were also enthusiasts of Shakespeare, who turned to his dramas for models of mental aberration that could be applied to their clinical practice. The case study of Ophelia was one that seemed particularly useful as an account of hysteria or mental breakdown in adolescence, a period of sexual instability which the Victorians regarded as risky for women's mental health. As Dr John Charles Bucknill, president of the Medico-Psychological Association, remarked in 1859, “Ophelia is the very type of a class of cases by no means uncommon. Every mental physician of moderately extensive experience must have seen many Ophelias. It is a copy from nature, after the fashion of the Pre-Raphaelite school.”26 Dr John Conolly, the celebrated superintendent of the Hanwell Asylum, and founder of the committee to make Stratford a national trust, concurred. In his Study of Hamlet in 1863 he noted that even casual visitors to mental institutions could recognize an Ophelia in the wards: “the same young years, the same faded beauty, the same fantastic dress and interrupted song.”27 Medical textbooks illustrated their discussions of female patients with sketches of Ophelia-like maidens.
But Conolly also pointed out that the graceful Ophelias who dominated the Victorian stage were quite unlike the women who had become the majority of the inmate population in Victorian public asylums. “It seems to be supposed,” he protested, “that it is an easy task to play the part of a crazy girl, and that it is chiefly composed of singing and prettiness. The habitual courtesy, the partial rudeness of mental disorder, are things to be witnessed.... An actress, ambitious of something beyond cold imitation, might find the contemplation of such cases a not unprofitable study.”28

Yet when Ellen Terry took up Conolly's challenge, and went to an asylum to observe real madwomen, she found them “too theatrical” to teach her anything.29 This was because the iconography of the romantic Ophelia had begun to infiltrate reality, to define a style for mad young women seeking to express and communicate their distress. And where the women themselves did not willingly throw themselves into Ophelia-like postures, asylum superintendents, armed with the new technology of photography, imposed the costume, gesture, props, and expression of Ophelia upon them. In England, the camera was introduced to asylum work in the 1850s by Dr Hugh Welch Diamond, who photographed his female patients at the Surrey Asylum and at Bethlem. Diamond was heavily influenced by literary and visual models in his posing of the female subjects. His pictures of madwomen, posed in prayer, or decked with Ophelia-like garlands, were copied for Victorian consumption as touched-up lithographs in professional journals.30

Reality, psychiatry, and representational convention were even more confused in the photographic records of hysteria produced in the 1870s by Jean-Martin Charcot. Charcot was the first clinician to install a fully-equipped photographic atelier in his Paris hospital, La Salpêtri ère, to record the performances of his hysterical stars. Charcot's clinic became, as he said, a “living theatre” of female pathology; his women patients were coached in their performances for the camera, and, under hypnosis, were sometimes instructed to play heroines from Shakespeare. Among them, a 15-year-old girl named Augustine was featured in the published volumes called Iconographies in every posture of la grande hystérie. With her white hospital gown and flowing locks, Augustine frequently resembles the reproductions of Ophelia as icon and actress which had been in wide circulation.31

But if the Victorian madwoman looks mutely out from men's pictures, and acts a part men had staged and directed, she is very differently represented in the feminist revision of Ophelia initiated by newly powerful and respectable Victorian actresses, and by women critics of Shakespeare. In their efforts to defend Ophelia, they invent a story for her drawn from their own experiences, grievances, and desires.
. . . . .
Probably the most famous of the Victorian feminist revisions of the Ophelia story was Mary Cowden Clarke's The Girlhood of Shakespeare's Heroines, published in 1852. Unlike other Victorian moralizing and didactic studies of the female characters of Shakespeare's plays, Clarke's was specifically addressed to the wrongs of women, and especially to the sexual double standard. In a chapter on Ophelia called “The rose of Elsinore,” Clarke tells how the child Ophelia was left behind in the care of a peasant couple when Polonius was called to the court at Paris, and raised in a cottage with a foster-sister and brother, Jutha and Ulf. Jutha is seduced and betrayed by a deceitful knight, and Ophelia discovers the bodies of Jutha and her stillborn child, lying “white, rigid, and still” in the deserted parlor of the cottage in the middle of the night. Ulf, a “hairy loutish boy,” likes to torture flies, to eat songbirds, and to rip the petals off roses, and he is also very eager to give little Ophelia what he calls a bearhug. Both repelled and masochistically attracted by Ulf, Ophelia is repeatedly cornered by him as she grows up; once she escapes the hug by hitting him with a branch of wild roses; another time, he sneaks into her bedroom “in his brutish pertinacity to obtain the hug he had promised himself,” but just as he bends over her trembling body, Ophelia is saved by the reappearance of her real mother.

A few years later, back at the court, she discovers the hanged body of another friend, who has killed herself after being “victimized and deserted by the same evil seducer.” Not surprisingly, Ophelia breaks down with brain fever—a staple mental illness of Victorian fiction—and has prophetic hallucinations of a brook beneath willow trees where something bad will happen to her. The warnings of Polonius and Laertes have little to add to this history of female sexual trauma.32

On the Victorian stage, it was Ellen Terry, daring and unconventional in her own life, who led the way in acting Ophelia in feminist terms as a consistent psychological study sexual intimidation, a girl terrified of her father, of her lover, and of life itself. Terry's debut as Ophelia in Henry Irving's production in 1878 was a landmark. According to one reviewer, her Ophelia was “the terrible spectacle of a normal girl becoming hopelessly imbecile as the result of overwhelming mental agony. Hers was an insanity without wrath or rage, without exaltation or paroxysms.”33 Her “poetic and intellectual performance” also inspired other actresses to rebel against the conventions of invisibility and negation associated with the part.
Terry was the first to challenge the tradition of Ophelia's dressing in emblematic white. For the French poets, such as Rimbaud, Hugo, Musset, Mallarmé and Laforgue, whiteness was part of Ophelia's essential feminine symbolism; they call her “blanche Ophélia” and compare her to a lily, a cloud, or snow. Yet whiteness also made her a transparency, an absence that took on the colors of Hamlet's moods, and that, for the symbolists like Mallarmé, made her a blank page to be written over or on by the male imagination. Although Irving was able to prevent Terry from wearing black in the mad scene, exclaiming “My God, Madam, there must be only one black figure in this play, and that's Hamlet!” (Irving, of course, was playing Hamlet), nonetheless actresses such as Gertrude Eliot, Helen Maude, Nora de Silva, and in Russia Vera Komisarjevskaya, gradually won the right to intensify Ophelia's presence by clothing her in Hamlet's black.34

By the turn of the century, there was both a male and a female discourse on Ophelia. A. C. Bradley spoke for the Victorian male tradition when he noted in Shakespearean Tragedy (1906) that “a large number of readers feel a kind of personal irritation against Ophelia; they seem unable to forgive her for not having been a heroine.”35 The feminist counterview was represented by actresses in such works as Helena Faucit's study of Shakespeare's female characters, and The True Ophelia, written by an anonymous actress in 1914, which protested against the “insipid little creature” of criticism, and advocated a strong and intelligent woman destroyed by the heartlessness of men.36 In women's paintings of the fin de siècle as well, Ophelia is depicted as an inspiring, even sanctified emblem of righteousness.37

While the widely read and influential essays of Mary Cowden Clarke are now mocked as the epitome of naive criticism, these Victorian studies of the girlhood of Shakespeare's heroines are of course alive and well as psychoanalytic criticism, which has imagined its own prehistories of oedipal conflict and neurotic fixation; and I say this not to mock psychoanalytic criticism, but to suggest that Clarke's musings on Ophelia are a pre-Freudian speculation on the traumatic sources of a female sexual identity. The Freudian interpretation of Hamlet concentrated on the hero, but also had much to do with the re-sexualization of Ophelia. As early as 1900, Freud had traced Hamlet's irresolution to an Oedipus complex, and Ernest Jones, his leading British disciple, developed this view, influencing the performances of John Gielgud and Alec Guinness in the 1930s. In his final version of the study, Hamlet and Oedipus, published in 1949, Jones argued that “Ophelia should be unmistakably sensual, as she seldom is on stage. She may be `innocent' and docile, but she is very aware of her body.”38

In the theater and in criticism, this Freudian edict has produced such extreme readings as that Shakespeare intends us to see Ophelia as a loose woman, and that she has been sleeping with Hamlet. Rebecca West has argued that Ophelia was not “a correct and timid virgin of exquisite sensibilities,” a view she attributes to the popularity of the Millais painting; but rather “a disreputable young woman.”39 In his delightful autobiography, Laurence Olivier, who made a special pilgrimage to Ernest Jones when he was preparing his Hamlet in the 1930s, recalls that one of his predecessors as actor-manager had said in response to the earnest question, “Did Hamlet sleep with Ophelia?”—“In my company, always.”40
The most extreme Freudian interpretation reads Hamlet as two parallel male and female psychodramas, the counterpointed stories of the incestuous attachments of Hamlet and Ophelia. As Theodor Lidz presents this view, while Hamlet is neurotically attached to his mother, Ophelia has an unresolved oedipal attachment to her father. She has fantasies of a lover who will abduct her from or even kill her father, and when this actually happens, her reason is destroyed by guilt as well as by lingering incestuous feelings. According to Lidz, Ophelia breaks down because she fails in the female developmental task of shifting her sexual attachment from her father “to a man who can bring her fulfillment as a woman.”41 We see the effects of this Freudian Ophelia on stage productions since the 1950s, where directors have hinted at an incestuous link between Ophelia and her father, or more recently, because this staging conflicts with the usual ironic treatment of Polonius, between Ophelia and Laertes. Trevor Nunn's production with Helen Mirren in 1970, for example, made Ophelia and Laertes flirtatious doubles, almost twins in their matching fur-trimmed doublets, playing duets on the lute with Polonius looking on, like Peter, Paul, and Mary. In other productions of the same period, Marianne Faithfull was a haggard Ophelia equally attracted to Hamlet and Laertes, and, in one of the few performances directed by a woman, Yvonne Nicholson sat on Laertes' lap in the advice scene, and played the part with “rough sexual bravado.”42
Since the 1960s, the Freudian representation of Ophelia has been supplemented by an antipsychiatry that represents Ophelia's madness in more contemporary terms. In contrast to the psychoanalytic representation of Ophelia's sexual unconscious that connected her essential femininity to Freud's essays on female sexuality and hysteria, her madness is now seen in medical and biochemical terms, as schizophrenia. This is so in part because the schizophrenic woman has become the cultural icon of dualistic femininity in the mid-twentieth century as the erotomaniac was in the seventeenth and the hysteric in the nineteenth. It might also be traced to the work of R. D. Laing on female schizophrenia in the 1960s. Laing argued that schizophrenia was an intelligible response to the experience of invalidation within the family network, especially to the conflicting emotional messages and mystifying double binds experienced by daughters. Ophelia, he noted in The Divided Self, is an empty space. “In her madness there is no one there.... There is no integral selfhood expressed through her actions or utterances. Incomprehensible statements are said by nothing. She has already died. There is now only a vacuum where there was once a person.”43
Despite his sympathy for Ophelia, Laing's readings silence her, equate her with “nothing,” more completely than any since the Augustans; and they have been translated into performances which only make Ophelia a graphic study of mental pathology. The sickest Ophelias on the contemporary stage have been those in the productions of the pathologist-director Jonathan Miller. In 1974 at the Greenwich Theatre his Ophelia sucked her thumb; by 1981, at the Warehouse in London, she was played by an actress much taller and heavier than the Hamlet (perhaps punningly cast as the young actor Anton Lesser). She began the play with a set of nervous tics and tuggings of hair which by the mad scene had become a full set of schizophrenic routines—head banging, twitching, wincing, grimacing, and drooling.44
But since the 1970s too we have had a feminist discourse which has offered a new perspective on Ophelia's madness as protest and rebellion. For many feminist theorists, the madwoman is a heroine, a powerful figure who rebels against the family and the social order; and the hysteric who refuses to speak the language of the patriarchal order, who speaks otherwise, is a sister.45 In terms of effect on the theater, the most radical application of these ideas was probably realized in Melissa Murray's agitprop play Ophelia, written in 1979 for the English women's theater group “Hormone Imbalance.” In this blank verse retelling of the Hamlet story, Ophelia becomes a lesbian and runs off with a woman servant to join a guerrilla commune.46

While I've always regretted that I missed this production, I can't proclaim that this defiant ideological gesture, however effective politically or theatrically, is all that feminist criticism desires, or all to which it should aspire. When feminist criticism chooses to deal with representation, rather than with women's writing, it must aim for a maximum interdisciplinary contextualism, in which the complexity of attitudes towards the feminine can be analyzed in their fullest cultural and historical frame. The alternation of strong and weak Ophelias on the stage, virginal and seductive Ophelias in art, inadequate or oppressed Ophelias in criticism, tells us how these representations have overflowed the text, and how they have reflected the ideological character of their times, erupting as debates between dominant and feminist views in periods of gender crisis and redefinition. The representation of Ophelia changes independently of theories of the meaning of the play or the Prince, for it depends on attitudes towards women and madness. The decorous and pious Ophelia of the Augustan age and the postmodern schizophrenic heroine who might have stepped from the pages of Laing can be derived from the same figure; they are both contradictory and complementary images of female sexuality in which madness seems to act as the “switching-point, the concept which allows the co-existence of both sides of the representation.”47 There is no “true ” Ophelia for whom feminist criticism must unambiguously speak, but perhaps only a Cubist Ophelia of multiple perspectives, more than the sum of all her parts.
But in exposing the ideology of representation, feminist critics have also the responsibility to acknowledge and to examine the boundaries of our own ideological positions as products of our gender and our time. A degree of humility in an age of critical hubris can be our greatest strength, for it is by occupying this position of historical self-consciousness in both feminism and criticism that we maintain our credibility in representing Ophelia, and that, unlike Lacan, when we promise to speak about her, we make good our word.



Notes

1. Jacques Lacan, “Desire and the interpretation of desire in Hamlet,” in Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise, ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore, 1982), 11, 20, 23. Lacan is also wrong about the etymology of Ophelia, which probably derives from the Greek for “help” or “succour.” Charlotte M. Yonge suggested a derivation from “ophis,” “serpent.” See her History of Christian Names (1884, republished Chicago, 1966), 346-7. I am indebted to Walter Jackson Bate for this reference.

2. Annette Kolodny, “Dancing through the minefield: some observations on the theory, practice, and politics of feminist literary criticism” (Feminist Studies, 6 (1980)), 7.

3. Carol Neely, “Feminist modes of Shakespearean criticism” (Women's Studies, 9 (1981)), 11.

4. Lee Edwards, “The labors of Psyche” (Critical Inquiry, 6 (1979)), 36.

5. Luce Irigaray: see New French Feminisms, ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York, 1982), 101. The quotation above, from III.ii, is taken from the Arden Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins (London and New York, 1982), 295. All quotations from Hamlet are from this text.

6. On images of negation and feminine enclosure, see David Wilbern, “Shakespeare's `nothing',” in Representing Shakespeare: New Psychoanalytic Essays, ed. Murray M. Schwartz and Coppélia Kahn (Baltimore, 1981).

7. David Leverenz, “The woman in Hamlet: an interpersonal view” (Signs, 4 (1978)), 303.

8. James Joyce, Ulysses (New York, 1961), 76.

9. Sander L. Gilman, Seeing the Insane (New York, 1981), 126.

10. See Michael Goldman, The Actor's Freedom: Toward a Theory of Drama (New York, 1975), for a stimulating discussion of the interpretative interaction between actor and audience.

11. Bridget Lyons, “The iconography of Ophelia” (English Literary History, 44 (1977)), 61.

12. See Maurice and Hanna Charney, “The language of Shakespeare's madwomen” (Signs, 3 (1977)), 451, 457; and Carroll Camden, “On Ophelia's madness” (Shakespeare Quarterly (1964)), 254.

13. See Margery Garber, Coming of Age in Shakespeare (London, 1981), 155-7; and Lyons, op. cit., 65, 70-2.

14. On dishevelled hair as a signifier of madness or rape, see Charney and Charney, op. cit., 452-3, 457; and Allan Dessen, Elizabethan Stage Conventions and Modern Interpreters (Cambridge, 1984), 36-8. Thanks to Allan Dessen for letting me see advance proofs of his book.

15. Charney and Charney, op. cit., 456.

16. Gaston Bachelard, L'Eau et les rêves (Paris, 1942), 109-25. See also Brigitte Peucker, “Dröste-Hulshof's Ophelia and the recovery of voice” (The Journal of English and Germanic Philology (1983)), 374-91.

17. Vieda Skultans, English Madness: Ideas on Insanity 1580-1890 (London, 1977), 79-81. On historical cases of love-melancholy, see Michael MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam (Cambridge, 1982).

18. C. E. L. Wingate, Shakespeare's Heroines on the Stage (New York, 1895), 283-4, 288-9.

19. Charles Hiatt, Ellen Terry (London, 1898), 11.

20. Max Byrd, Visits to Bedlam: Madness and Literature in the Eighteenth Century (Columbia, 1974), xiv.

21. Peter Raby, Fair Ophelia: Harriet Smithson Berlioz (Cambridge, 1982), 63.

22. Ibid., 68.

23. Ibid., 72, 75.

24. Quoted in Camden, op. cit., 247.

25. Raby, op. cit., 182.

26. J. C. Bucknill, The Psychology of Shakespeare (London, 1859, reprinted New York, 1970), 110. For more extensive discussions of Victorian psychiatry and Ophelia figures, see Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture (New York, forthcoming 1985).

27. John Conolly, Study of Hamlet (London, 1863), 177.

28. Ibid., 177-8, 180.

29. Ellen Terry, The Story of My Life (London, 1908), 154.

30. Diamond's photographs are reproduced in Sander L. Gilman, The Face of Madness: Hugh W. Diamond and the Origin of Psychiatric Photography (New York, 1976).

31. See Georges Didi-Huberman, L'Invention de l'hystérie (Paris, 1982), and Stephen Heath, The Sexual Fix (London, 1983), 36.

32. Mary Cowden Clarke, The Girlhood of Shakespeare's Heroines (London, 1852). See also George C. Gross, “Mary Cowden Clarke, The Girlhood of Shakespeare's Heroines, and the sex education of Victorian women” (Victorian Studies, 16 (1972)), 37-58, and Nina Auerbach, Woman and the Demon (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 210-15.

33. Hiatt, op. cit., 114. See also Wingate, op. cit., 304-5.

34. Terry, op. cit., 155-6.

35. Andrew C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (London, 1906), 160.

36. Helena Faucit Martin, On Some of Shakespeare's Female Characters (Edinburgh and London, 1891), 4, 18; and The True Ophelia (New York, 1914), 15.

37. Among these paintings are the Ophelias of Henrietta Rae and Mrs F. Littler. Sarah Bernhardt sculpted a bas relief of Ophelia for the Women's Pavilion at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893.

38. Ernest Jones, Hamlet and Oedipus (New York, 1949), 139.

39. Rebecca West, The Court and the Castle (New Haven, 1958), 18.

40. Laurence Olivier, Confessions of an Actor (Harmondsworth, 1982), 102, 152.

41. Theodor Lidz, Hamlet's Enemy: Madness and Myth in Hamlet (New York, 1975), 88, 113.

42. Richard David, Shakespeare in the Theatre (Cambridge, 1978), 75. This was the production directed by Buzz Goodbody, a brilliant young feminist radical who killed herself that year. See Colin Chambers, Other Spaces: New Theatre and the RSC (London, 1980), especially 63-7.

43. R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (Harmondsworth, 1965), 195n.

44. David, op. cit., 82-3; thanks to Marianne DeKoven, Rutgers University, for the description of the 1981 Warehouse production.

45. See, for example, Hélène Cixous and Catherine Cl ément, La Jeune Née (Paris, 1975).

46. For an account of this production, see Micheline Wandor, Understudies: Theatre and Sexual Politics (London, 1981), 47.

47. I am indebted for this formulation to a critique of my earlier draft of this paper by Carl Friedman, at the Wesleyan Center for the Humanities, April 1984.

Publication Details: Shakespeare and the Question of Theory. Ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman. 1985. p77-94.

Source: Shakespearean Criticism. Ed. Dana Ramel Barnes. Vol. 35. Detroit: Gale Research, 1997. From Literature Resource Center